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In the united states district court northern district of oklahoma united states of america


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Katniss Everdeen & Peeta Mellark

District 13, Location Unknown


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

Plaintiff, )



)

v. )



) Case: XXXXXX

)

Everdeen Katniss )

Defendants. )


Reply to “UNITED STATES’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO VACATE
Comes Now Everdeen Katniss and Peeta Mellark (“Defendants”) with this Reply to “UNITED STATES’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO VACATE (“Opposition”)” (“Reply”). This Reply was delayed due to receiving the Public Records Filings of Defendants.

Table of Contents

I. Sean M. Green (“AG Green”) Opposition On Jurisdiction. 2

A. Jurisdiction of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Pending Resolution of Motion to Vacate. 3

B. Jurisdiction of the United States District Court and “Internal Revenue Laws” 3

a. Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter Using Rule 60(b)(4) and “Due Process of Law”. 3

b. Internal Revenue Laws. 4

II. AG Green’s ipse dixit Pontifications as “Nonsensical and Meritless” on Page 3 for ALL of the following Issues (1) “citizens of Oklahoma,” (2) 14th Amendment doesn’t Apply to the District of Columbia; and (3)15th Amendment doesn’t Confer any Right of Suffrage; and, (4) IRS is Violating the Administrative Procedure Act; and (5) The IRS hasn’t promulgated any “substantive regulations,” and (6) the IRS is trying to Force the Defendants to File a Form 1040. 6

A. (1) “citizens of Oklahoma.” 7

B. (2) The Fourteenth Amendment Doesn’t Apply To “citizens of the United States” in the District of Columbia or to the District of Columbia. 9

C. (3) The Fifteenth Amendment Does not Confer any Right of Suffrage on Anyone. 9

D. (4) The IRS Is In Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 Codified in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(c)(d) 10

a. Regulation 26 CFR § 301.6203-1 Is an Interpretative Regulation. 12

b. Offer of Proof on 26 CFR § 301.6203-1 12

c. Memorandum on “Interpretative Regulations” and Authority of 26 U.S.C § 7805 Only. 15

E. (5) Has the IRS Ever Promulgated any Substantive Regulations in Compliance With 1946 APA §§4(a) & 4(c) Codified Today in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(c)(d). 18

F. (6) The IRS is Attempting to Force the Defendants to File Form 1040 OMB 1545-0074 or Sign Substitute for Returns. 19

III. Irrebuttable Presumptions – Conclusive Presumptions 20

IV. Tax Court Adjudicates using the “public rights” Doctrine and the Public Rights Doctrine is ONLY in the District of Columbia and Territories under the Plenary Power of Congress. 20

A. Chief Counsel Wilkins in This Instant Case 4-12-cv-441. 20

V. Jurisdictional Issues to Enter an Article III Court. 22

VI. Conclusion 23

VII. Certificate of Service 24



I. Sean M. Green (“AG Green”) Opposition On Jurisdiction.


As AG Green dispensed with the all of the issues of Law and Fact of the Defendant’s Motion to Vacate and prior Motions with AG Green’s ipse dixit pontification in Docket 158––Opposition consisting of “These arguments are nonsensical and meritless,” “The basis for their claim is largely indecipherable” and coupled with “Whatever the argument, it is meritless;” wherein this Court denied the over length brief. The Defendants will attempt to provide material facts, ultimate facts, issues of Fact and Law arising under the Constitution of the United States within the several States, Constitution of the United States Article III Courts of the United States exercising the judicial Power of the United States, Laws of the United States; and, arising under the Constitution of Oklahoma and the Laws of Oklahoma to expose the FRAUD and obfuscation of the mere “twenty words” of AG Green. AG Green’s Opposition at Docket is divided into four sections

A. Jurisdiction of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Pending Resolution of Motion to Vacate.


The issue Motion to Vacate and the current Abatement in the Case No. 15-XXXXX in the 10th Circuit was resolved by the 10th Circuit quite succinctly in the ORDER of May 6th, 2015.

B. Jurisdiction of the United States District Court and “Internal Revenue Laws”


In AG Green’s Opposition he relies upon Rule 60(b)(4) “lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter” or “acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.”

a. Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter Using Rule 60(b)(4) and “Due Process of Law”.


Using Rule 60(b)(4) for “jurisdiction” issues this Court is to take judicial Notice of Attachment A––48 Stat. 1064, 1934 and especially “They [rules] shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.” This use of “rules” to make “Laws of the United States” of no “further force or effect” is in opposition to the judicial Power to be vested in the Supreme Court of the United States exercising the judicial Power of the United States in all Cases and Controversies in Law and Equity as pronounced in Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 301-303 (Sup.Ct.Tenn. 1871), to wit:

It is certainly true that the supreme law of the land, in this country, is the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and the treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding * * * if it violate the constitution, laws, or a treaty of the United States, it is simply void, and the courts of every State are bound by the supreme law, and not by the State law:” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr., 137; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall., 386; Satterlie v. Mattison, 2 Peters, 380; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 399. * * * But the Supreme Court of the United States is the tribunal of last resort on all such questions, whose judgment is conclusive and final upon the question, whether an Act of Congress be or be not the supreme law of the land: Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 508, 5191 (1858).

“Due Process of Law” is the “Law of the Land” as held in many cases including Hurtado v. People of State of California, 110 U.S. 516, 543 (1884), to wit:

‘The words ‘due process of law’ were undoubtedly intended,' said this court, in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken, etc., Co. ‘to convey the same meaning as the words ‘by the law of the land’ in Magna Charta.' That the one is the equivalent of the other was recognized in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877). See also 2 Kent, 13; 2 Story, Const. § 1789; Cooley, Const. Lim. 353; Pom. Const. Law, § 245; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. 311. Whether the phrase in our American constitutions, national or state, be ‘law of the land’ or ‘due process of law,’ it means in every case the same thing. Cooley, Const. Lim. 352.

“Due Process of Law” invokes the “Laws of the United States.” See Shitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 244 (1895); Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68, 72 (1900); Lott v. Pittman, 243 U.S. 588, 590 (1917); New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co. of Louisiana v. State of Louisiana, 180 U.S. 320, 322 (1901).

“Due Process of Law” precludes “Internal Revenue Laws,” which is under the plenary Power of Congress being only one instance of the FRAUD of the AG Green.


b. Internal Revenue Laws.


AG Green cites the jurisdiction in the Opposition “In is plain that 26 U.S.C. § 7402 and 28 U.S.C. § 1340 explicitly vest federal district courts with jurisdiction over civil actions involving the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.The Defendants CONCUR that this instant case is under the jurisdiction of theinternal revenue laws,” i.e., the Laws of Congress/Acts of Congress; wherein Congress exercises its Plenary Power that is not under the “Laws of the United States” in the Constitution of the United States arises under Article III, Section 2 and under Article VI Clause 2.

In 26 U.S.C. § 7402––Jurisdiction of district courts (a) “and to render such judgments and decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws * * * (b) . . . if any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear.”

In 28 U.S.C. § 1340––Internal Revenue; custom duties “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue, or revenue from imports.”

Laws of Congress,” i.e., “Acts of Congress” are used interchangeably where the issues are under the Plenary Power of Congress in either the District of Columbia or the Territories. In Shshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 511 (1900) “[A]s the laws of Congress alone determine the matter of the disposal of the public lands2, it follows that the question of law which are thus open for consideration are those arising under the acts of Congress.” See also Landes v. Brant, 51 U.S. 348, 364 (1850) (Public land); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 386 (1910) (Territories – Phillipines).

The “Internal Revenue,” “Taxation” or “revenue from Imports” is under the “public rights” doctrine under the Plenary Power of Congress in the District of Columbia or the Territories. This is pronounced in Kuretski v. C.I.R., 755 F.3d 929, 939, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2014), to wit:

Although the precise contours of the “public rights” doctrine are not fully formed, see Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2610; Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 n. 8, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989), it is “settled” that the category of public rights includes matters of “internal revenue” and “taxation,” at least at the pre-collection stage. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450–51 & nn. 8–9, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284, 18 How. 272, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1856). Congress therefore can constitutionally assign the adjudication of pre-collection tax disputes to non-Article III tribunals. See Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Comm’r, 930 F.2d 975, 992 (2d Cir.1991) (“The relationship between the government and taxpayer plainly gives rise to public rights and we have no doubt that the resolution of such disputes can be relegated to a non-Article III forum.”), abrogated on other grounds by Freytag, 501 U.S. at 892, 111 S.Ct. 2631.

Due to the page limitations, the Defendants can’t articulate the many substantive and fundamental Issues of this Instant Case as required, therefore this Court shall take judicial Notice of Kuretski v. C.I.R., 755 F.3d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2014) and the issues contained therein as evidenced by Attachment B–– Kuretski v. C.I.R., 755 F.3d 929, 939, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Kuretski”)

II. AG Green’s ipse dixit Pontifications as “Nonsensical and Meritless” on Page 3 for ALL of the following Issues (1) “citizens of Oklahoma,” (2) 14th Amendment doesn’t Apply to the District of Columbia; and (3)15th Amendment doesn’t Confer any Right of Suffrage; and, (4) IRS is Violating the Administrative Procedure Act; and (5) The IRS hasn’t promulgated any “substantive regulations,” and (6) the IRS is trying to Force the Defendants to File a Form 1040.


AG Green cites no Authority, Facts, and Cases but relies ONLY upon “These arguments are nonsensical and meritless” dispensing with all of the above and following six (6) issues. The AG does not ADDRESS the “public rights” doctrine, identify the Plenary Power of Congress or address the Defendants only alleged Remedy in the Tax Court that ONLY adjudicates using the “pubic rights” doctrine also currently under that illusion of Justice adjudication. In the jurisdiction and venue of the “public rights” doctrine devoid of any Laws of the United States, Due Process of Law, No independent Judiciary exercising the judicial Power of the United States, no citizens of the several States and where being the type of “citizen of the United States” under the 14th Amendment, you have no rights or remedies except what Congress chooses to offer some remedy and the Supreme Court of the United States using the “incorporation” doctrine chooses to give that fictional “citizen of the United States” access to, therein AG Green is 100% correct.

A. (1) “citizens of Oklahoma.”


The Defendants are both “citizens of Oklahoma” and have their unalienable rights secured in the Constitution of Oklahoma. They are not “citizens of the United States” under 14 Stat. 27 memorialized in the 14th Amendment that are using the “public rights” doctrine with no remedies in any constitutional Court.

The question arises where is the right or privilege of voting arise under: The Constitution of the United States or the constitution of one of the several States? The answer is found in United States v. Anthony, 24 F.Cas. 829, 829, 830 (Cir.Ct. N.D.N.Y. 1873), to wit:

The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were designed mainly for the protection of the newly emancipated negroes, but full effect must, nevertheless, be given to the language employed.

* * *


The right of voting, or the privilege of voting, is a right or privilege arising under the constitution of the state, and not under the constitution of the United States; and second, that a right of the character here involved is not one connected with citizenship of the United States.

* * *


[I]f rights of a citizen are thereby violated, they are of that fundamental class, derived from his position as a citizen of the state, and not those limited rights belonging to him as a citizen of the United States; and such was the decision in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 551, 552 (1823)
In Kineen v. Wells, 11 N.E. 916, 918, 919 (Sup.Jud.Ct.Mass. 1887), to wit:

If the legislature can impose certain restrictions upon one class of voters, and exempt another, what is the limit to its discretion?

* * *

The right or privilege of voting is a right or privilege arising under the constitution of each state, and not under the constitution of the United States. The voter is entitled to vote in the election of officers of the United States by reason of the fact that he is a voter in the state in which he resides. He exercises this right because he is entitled to by the laws of the state where he offers to exercise it, and not because he is a citizen of the United States. United States v. Anthony, 24 F.Cas. 829, 830 (Cir.Ct. N.D.N.Y. 1873)



In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 551, 552 (1823), a case the Circuit Court of the United States has described the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States in great detail including this excerpt to which some additional protections under fourteenth Amendment were overlaid but the fundamental right of the elective franchise is still posited in the constitution of one of the several States, to wit:

[M]ay be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.

This Political Status, Citizenship and Allegiance of Katniss Everdeen is evidenced by Attachment C––Certificate of Political Status, Citizenship and Allegiance of Katniss Everdeen “2015-XXXX- Recording District 311 Palmer” (“Katniss’s Certificate”) and Attachment D–-Oklahoma Voter Application of Katniss Everdeen (“Kantiss’s Voter Application”) referencing in Kantiss’s Voter Application to give Notice to the Division of Elections of Oklahoma of the public Record filing of “2015-XXXX-0 Recording District 311 Palmer” in Palmer, Alaska, being Katniss’s Certificate.

This Political Status, Citizenship and Allegiance of Peeta Mellark evidenced by Attachment E––Certificate of Political Status, Citizenship and Allegiance of Peeta Mellark “2015-XXXXX-0 Recording District 311 Palmer” (“Peeta’s Certificate”) Attachment E––Certificate of Political Status, Citizenship and Allegiance of Peeta Mellark “2015-009061-0 Recording District 311 Palmer” (“Peeta’s Certificate”) and Attachment F–-Oklahoma Voter Application of Peeta Mellark (“Peeta’s Voter Application”) referencing in Peeta’s Voter Application to give Notice to the Division of Elections of Oklahoma of the public Record filing of “2015-XXXXX-0 Recording District 311 Palmer” in Palmer, Alaska, being Peeta’s Certificate.

This Court shall take judicial Notice of Attachments B, C, D and E.

B. (2) The Fourteenth Amendment Doesn’t Apply To “citizens of the United States” in the District of Columbia or to the District of Columbia.


In Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d 246, 250 FN10 (1940) citing the holding of Wright v. Davidson, 181 US. 371, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1940), to wit:

[H]olding the Fourteenth Amendment inapplicable to the District of Columbia. On the other hand, the rights and liberties protected by the bill of rights (Amendments I to VIII) against encroachment by the national government have been held applicable to the District although not to the states. Thus, the provisions of the Fourth Amendment are not applicable to the states (National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 34 S.Ct. 209, 58 L.Ed. 504; Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, 24 S.Ct. 703, 48 L.Ed. 1062), although they are to the District. United States v. Mattingly, 52 App.D.C. 188, 285 F. 922

A “citizen of the United States” in the District of Columbia’s Statutes is a “qualified elector” as found in DC ST § 1-1001.02 (2) “The term “qualified elector” means a person who . . . (B) is a citizen of the United States.” A “citizen of the United States” outside of the District of Columbia under the Fourteenth Amendment is a fiction in law––“All of this is a fiction in law3” and has the same rights a “corporation, which is included in the Fourteenth Amendment definition of “person” as found in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 436 U.S. 765, 780 FN15 (1978). Also this “citizen of the United States” in 14 Stat. 27 (1866) codified today in 42 U.S.C. §§§ 1981, 1982 and 1988 that has the same rights as a “white citizen” is memorialized in the 14th Amendment.

C. (3) The Fifteenth Amendment Does not Confer any Right of Suffrage on Anyone.


The holding in the Supreme Court of the United States holds that the 15th does not confer any Right of Suffrage on anyone Le Grand v. United States, 12 F. 577, 578, 579 (Cir.Ct. E.D.Tx. 1882) in opposition to AG Green’s denial, to wit:

The fifteenth amendment can have no application. That amendment relates to the right of citizens of the United States to vote. It does not confer the right of suffrage on any one. It merely invests citizens of the United States with the constitutional right of exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); S.C. 1 Woods, 322.


D. (4) The IRS Is In Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 Codified in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(c)(d)


We find in the “Federal tax liabilities” in Docket 2––Complaint, Docket 42––Motion for Amended Complaint, Docket 43––Motion by Wells Fargo, Docket 64––Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket 65––Memorandum for Summary Judgment Exhibits, Docket 90––Reply on Summary Judgment, Docket 108––United States’ Response, Docket 136––United States Motion to Strike and Doc 151––Exhibit C consisting of 2428 pages. Then we find “Reduce to Judgment” used in conjunction with “Federal Tax Liabilities” or used in conjunction with “Assessed” or “Assessments4, passim. For any “Federal Tax Liabilities” to Exist, there must exist some “determination”5 in FACTS and in PROCEDUREs to claim the irrebuttable presumptions and conclusive presumptions of “Assessments,” “Assessed Tax,”, Penalties of Interest and Assessed Tax,” Date of Assessment”

In the Complaint AG Sexsmith and AG Green (“AGs”) disclose that “Assessments” must exist being the sine qua non of any “Reduce” to “Judgment” Complaint i.e., “Count I: To Reduce Assessments to Judgment” on page 3 et seq.; and “Assessments” must exist being the sine qua non to “Count IV: To Enforce the Federal Tax Lien in the Complaint pg. 12 et seq. claiming “Assessments.”

The AGs fraudulently,6 knowingly and intentionally avoided the mandated issues in the unambiguous Statutes of the United States codified Title 26––Method of Assessment, to wit:

The assessment shall be made by recording the liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary in accordance with rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Upon request of the taxpayer, the Secretary shall furnish the taxpayer a copy of the record of the assessment.

Even if the Title 26––Method of Assessment is in reality in the “public rights” doctrine venue and jurisdiction, i.e., “internal revenue laws,” therein arises the question that with no rule of law and no Laws of the United States is the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) mandated to comply with 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(c)(d) and disclose any alleged legal duty by promulgated regulations to accomplish the alleged “assessment;” or is 26 CFR 301.6203-1 sufficient as in the “public rights” doctrine the Defendants have no rights or remedies.

The only regulations admitted to by the AGs is 26 CFR § 301.6203-1 under the authority of 26 U.S.C. § 6203––Method of Assessment. This is evidenced by Attachment G––UNITED STATES’ OBJECTION AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS, Peeta Mellark’S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS (“A”) pgs. and questions: 30––#69, 30-31––#70, 31––#71, 31-32––#72, 32––#73, 32––#75.––As to “withholding agent” admits to Subtitle C––Employment taxes of 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101 and 3102. Deficiencies of Subtitle C are precluded in 26 U.S.C. § 6211 and 6212 and therein precluded for “assessments” under § 6203, 32-33––#75––­Admits that “federal taxes withheld from Peeta Mellark’s wages were turned over the IRS by his employer,” making the employer a “withholding agent” as defined in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(16), which is totally comprehensive in “(a)(16) Withholding agent.--The term "withholding agent" means any person required to deduct and withhold any tax under the provisions of section 1441, 1442, 1443, or 1461 and 40––#102–– That there are no “substantive regulations” promulgated that have the “force and effect of law” to which the AGs admit to only 26 CFR § 301.6203-1.

a. Regulation 26 CFR § 301.6203-1 Is an Interpretative Regulation.


The only regulation admitted to by the AGs and in the public record it 26 CFR § 301.6203-1, which is merely an “interpretative regulation” that has no “force and effect of law”7 and is promulgated strictly under the authority of 26 U.S.C. § 7805, 26 CFR § 301. 6203-1 is as follows, to wit:

26 C.F.R § 301.6203–1 Method of assessment. Treas. Reg. § 30-1.6203-1

The district director and the director of the regional service center shall appoint one or more assessment officers. The district director shall also appoint assessment officers in a Service Center servicing his district. The assessment shall be made by an assessment officer signing the summary record of assessment. The summary record, through supporting records, shall provide identification of the taxpayer, the character of the liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the amount of the assessment. The amount of the assessment shall, in the case of tax shown on a return by the taxpayer, be the amount so shown, and in all other cases the amount of the assessment shall be the amount shown on the supporting list or record. The date of the assessment is the date the summary record is signed by an assessment officer. If the taxpayer requests a copy of the record of assessment, he shall be furnished a copy of the pertinent parts of the assessment which set forth the name of the taxpayer, the date of assessment, the character of the liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the amounts assessed.



CREDITS: [32 FR 15241, Nov. 3, 1967]

SOURCE: 32 FR 15241, Nov. 3, 1967; T.D. 9610, 78 FR 5994, Jan. 28, 2013; T.D. 9628, 78 FR 49369, Aug. 14, 2013; T.D. 9679, 79 FR 41891, July 18, 2014; T.D. 9687, 79 FR 47264, Aug. 12, 2014, unless otherwise noted.

b. Offer of Proof on 26 CFR § 301.6203-1


1. As an Offer of Proof for 26 CFR § 301.6203-1 under the Credits of 32 FR 15241, Nov. 3, 1967 the Defendants present a true and correct excerpt copy evidenced by Attachment H––32 FR 15241-15247 & 15274 with the only authority being promulgated for the Federal Register of 32 FR 15247 being only 26 U.S.C. § 7805 and 26 U.S.C. § 6203 is NOT listed––“AUTHORITY: The provision of this Part 301 issued under sec. 7805, I.R.C. 1954,; 68A Stat. 917; 256 U.S.C 7805.”

2. There are two of the Federal Listing under Source that have 26 CFR § 6203-1 in them being the following:

a. As an Offer of Proof that 26 CFR § 6203-1 is not issued of the Authority of 5 U.S.C. 553(b) required for a “substantive regulations” to have the “force and effect of law8” as held in Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 282, 301-302 (1979) “affecting individual rights and obligations,” ibid @ 282; this is evidenced in excerpt in Attachment I––78 FR 5994, 5874, 5898, ibid @ 5898, “It has been determined that sections 553(b) and (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. Chapter 6) do not apply to those applications.” 78 FR 5994 is the only Federal Register under SOURCE that has the 26 CFR § 6203-1 in the regulations listed.

In the Holdings of Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 282, 301, 302 (1979), to wit:

In order for a regulation to have the "force and effect of law," it must be a "substantive" or "legislative-type" rule affecting individual rights and obligations (as do the regulations in the case at bar), and it must be the product of a congressional grant of legislative authority, promulgated in conformity with any procedural requirements imposed by Congress [5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(c)(d)].

Ibid. 301-302, to wit:

In order for a regulation to have the "force and effect of law," it must have certain substantive characteristics and be the product of certain procedural requisites. The central distinction among agency regulations found in the APA is that between "substantive rules" on the one hand and "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" on the other. [FN30]

A "substantive rule" is not defined in the APA, and other authoritative sources essentially offer definitions by negative inference. [FN31]

But in Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974), we **1718 noted a characteristic inherent in the concept of a "substantive rule." We described a substantive rule--or a "legislative-type rule," id., at 236, 94 S.Ct., at 1074--as one "affecting individual rights and obligations." Id., at 232, 94 S.Ct., at 1073. This characteristic is an important touchstone for distinguishing those rules that may be "binding" or have the "force of law." Id., at 235, 236, 94 S.Ct., at 1074.



a. FN30. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(d).

b. FN31. Statement of Policies.

FN31. In contrast it suggests that "interpretive rules" and "general statements of policy" do not have the force and effect of law. Interpretive rules are "issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers." Ibid. General statements of policy are "statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power." Ibid. See also Final Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 27 (1941).
From Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302, 304 (1979)––Substantive Regulations that are “affecting individual rights and obligations9” and to have the “force and effect of law” must have the following attributes, to wit:

(1) [@ 302] Be rooted in a grant of such power by Congress and subject to the limitation which that body imposes; and,

(2) Be “issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and implement the statue;” and,

(3) Must conform with the procedural requirements [5 U.S.C. 553(b)(c)(d)] imposed by Congress; and,

(4) Agency discretion is limited not only by the substantive, statutory grants of authority, but also by the procedural requirements which “assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general applications; and,

(5) [@ 304] It is necessary to establish a nexus between the regulations and some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress.


c. Memorandum on “Interpretative Regulations” and Authority of 26 U.S.C § 7805 Only.


As to the “essential element” of Assessment 26 U.S.C. § 6203 to exist to accomplish the claimed Assessment, wherein only the “interpretative regulation” of 26 CFR § 301.6203-1 exists and admitted to by the AGs that has no “force and effect of law,” can’t create any obligation or legal duty, is not in compliance with the mandates of 1 CFR § 21.40, 1 CFR § 21.41 and 1 CFR § 21.43, is promulgated only under the authority of 26 U.S.C. § 7805 and being the ONLY regulation admitted to by the AGs, therein the Defendants do via Attachment J––Memorandum on Interpretative Regulations (“J’) submit that this Court take judicial Notice of the Issues of Law and Fact in Attachment J on “interpretative regulations.”

As evidenced in Attachment K––UNITED STATES’ OBJECTION AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS, Peeta Mellark’S REQUEST FOR INTERROGATORIES (“K”) as the answers posed concerning 26 U.S.C. § 6203––Method of Assessment.:

In B––pg.10, #3, #4, #5––Question concerning compliance of mandatory promulgation of regulations or rules for Subtitle A––Income Taxes mandated to exist to accomplish Assessment in the unambiguous Statutes of the United States codified in 26 U.S.C. § 6203––Method of Assessment, being in compliance required by 1 CFR § 21.43(a)(1), the APA of 1946 § 4(a) and § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(c)(d). The AGs refused to address the Question claiming that ““Subtitle A Part 1” is undefined and susceptible to many meanings;” and, “The United States further objects because all regulations that have been promulgated by the Secretary of Treasury are available to the general public.”

a. FACT: Yes, all of the regulations that have been promulgated by the Treasury are available to which the Defendants concur; of course, the AGs can’t identify the specific regulations promulgated under the Authority of 26 U.S.C. § 6203––Method of Assessment.

As an Offer of Proof of the promulgation of the 1 CFRs and specifically the requirements of 1 CFR § 21.40, 1 CFR § 21.41 and 1 CFR § 21.43 the Defendants enter into evidence Attachment L––1 CFR 1.1-22.7..

Under the Authority of ACFR, 1 CFR § 21.4010 of Authority citations “Each section subject to codification must include or covered by, a complete citation of authority under which the section is issued, including—-(a) General or specific authority delegated by statute; . . .”

Under the Authority of ACFR, 1 CFR § 21.4111 under “Agency responsibility” “(a) Each issuing agency is responsible for the accuracy and integrity of the citations of authority in the documents it issues. (b) Each issuing agency shall formally amend citation of authority in its codified material to reflect any changes therein.”

Under the Authority of ACFR, 1 CFR § 21.4312 on “Placing and amending authority citations” defines the requirement of citations, i.e. statutory authorities, to be located behind the Table of Contents for a complete CFR part or subpart, to wit:

(a) The requirements for placing authority citations vary with the type of amendment the agency is making in a document. The agency shall set out the full text of the authority citation for each Part affected by the document.

(1) If a document sets out an entire CFR part, the agency shall place the complete authority citation directly after the table of contents and before the regulatory text.

(2) If a document amends only certain sections within a CFR part, the agency shall present the complete authority citation to this part as the first item in the list of amendments.

(i) If the authority for issuing an amendment is the same as the authority listed for the whole CFR part, the agency shall simply restate the authority.

(ii) If the authority for issuing an amendment changes the authority citation for the whole CFR part, the agency shall revise the authority citation in its entirety. The agency may specify the particular authority under which certain sections are amended in the revised authority citation.

(b) The agency shall present a centralized authority citation. The authority citation shall appear at the end of the table of contents for a part or after each subpart heading within the text of a part. Citations of authority for particular sections may be specified within the centralized authority citation.


The Offer of Proof is evidenced in a true an correct copy of the public record that AGs referenced in the Interrogatories “K––pg.10, #3, #4, #5, supra, by the AGs that “(a) General or specific authority delegated by statute” [§ 6203] must be published; and, ““(a) Each issuing agency is responsible for the accuracy and integrity of the citations of authority in the documents it issues” in 1 CFR 21.41, being the IRS; and, “the agency shall place the complete authority citation directly after the table of contents[§ 6203] in 1 CFR 21.43(a)(1) wherein this Offer of Proof of the public record true and correct copy as evidenced by Attachment L––1 CFR 1.1-22.7.

The AGs referenced in the Interrogatories “K––pg.10, #3, #4, #5, supra, the regulations would in the public record, wherein the Defendants would provide as an Offer of Proof that the regulations mandated by 26 U.S.C. § 6203––Method of Assessment for this specific Statutory Authority have NEVER been promulgated in compliance with 1 CFR § 21.40, 1 CFR § 21.41 and specifically behind the “Table of Contents” of 1 CFR § 21.43 under the statutory Authority of § 6203 which is evidenced in the Offer of Proof of the excerpts of the Thirteen Volumes of Part 1 Subtitle A––Income Taxes, but also included to be comprehensive are the Part 20 Subtitle B–­Gifts and Estates, the Part 31 Subtitle C––Employments Taxes and even the interpretative regulations of Part 301 Regulations and this Offer of Proof excerpts of a true and copy of the public record is evidenced in Attachment M––Pt. 1 (V1-V13), Pt. 20, Pt. 31 & Pt. 301.


E. (5) Has the IRS Ever Promulgated any Substantive Regulations in Compliance With 1946 APA §§4(a) & 4(c) Codified Today in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(c)(d).


There is a critical question being has the IRS ever to Date promulgated any substantive regulations in compliance with the 1946 APA §§ 4(a) & 4(c) codified today in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(c)(d) for Subtitle A––Income Taxes or under the 1954 “Internal Revenue Code” with the resounding Answer is NO!

As an Offer of Proof, the Defendants present the excerpt of the Volume 1 (§§ 1.0-1.60) of the Thirteen Volumes of the Part 1 Subtitle A––Income Taxes, being Attachment N––Volume 1, Part 1 (§§ 1.0 to 1.60) (“N”), with the Offer of Proof being on N, pg. 13 evidencing 19 FR 5167, Aug. 17, 1954 that only includes Paragraphs 1-4 but part of the 19 FR 5167 paragraph 4 is missing, to wit:

Because this Treasury decision merely provides for the continuance of existing rules pending further action, it is hereby found that it is impracticable and contrary to the public interest to incur the delay which would result if this Treasury decision were issued with notice and public procedure thereon under section 4 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, approved June 11, 1946, or subject to the effective date limitation of section 4 (c) of said act. (68A Stat. 917; 26 U. S. C. 7805)

[SEAL] M. B. FOLSOM,



Acting Secretary of the Treasury,

AUGUST 16, 1954.

[F. R. Doc, 54-6437; Filed, Aug. 16, 1954; 12:29 p. m.]

As an Offer of Proof of the Complete 19 FR 5167 of Aug. 17, 1954, which is evidenced in Attachment O––19 FR 5167 (“O––19 FR 5167”).

This is FRAUD to hide the FACT that the IRS has no intention of issuing any “substantive rules” in compliance with § 4(a) and § 4(c) codified today in in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(c)(d). Of course with the NON-Disclosure of the exclusive use of the “public rights” doctrine therein “substantive regulations” are irrelevant. Another ruse.

As evidence of more FRAUD by the IRS, Part 1 Subtitle A––Income Taxes were republished in November 26, 1960 in 25 FR 11402 to 25 FR 12162. There was no indication in 25 FR 11402 to 25 FR 12162 of compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, approved June 11, 1946 of sections 4(a) and 4(c). The IRS to hide the compliance issue of the 1946 APA §§4(a) & 4(c) waited until December 31, 1960 (36 days) and then in 25 FR 14021 to 25 FR 14202, referenced the publication requirements of 25 FR 11402 to 25 FR 12162 referencing back to O––19 FR 5167 stating there was no compliance with §§ 4(a) or 4(c). As an Offer of Proof of this Deception of the IRS, the Defendants offer a true and correct of the public record 25 FR 14021 to 25 FR 14202 evidenced by Attachment P–-25 FR 14021 to 25 FR 14022 that references back to O––19 FR 5167.


F. (6) The IRS is Attempting to Force the Defendants to File Form 1040 OMB 1545-0074 or Sign Substitute for Returns.

As the Form 1040 OMB 1545-0074 is an “implied-in-law” contract and it is already in the record that the Defendants have not filed in Form 1040 in 2001-2004. But as evidenced in the Tax court Cases No. XXXX-12L and Tax Court No. XXXX-12 the very same Chief Counsel Wilkins and his Attorney have plead that that the Substitute for Returns under 6020(b) and in compliance with CC-2007-005 are valid and the Chief Counsel in collusion with the Tax Court Judges (sic) keep threating to issue Penalties if the Defendant does not sign the waivers for the Substitute for Return and this Court shall take judicial Notice of Tax court Cases No. 3XXX-12L and Tax Court No. XXXX-12 for conformation thereof.


III. Irrebuttable Presumptions – Conclusive Presumptions


In Bailey v. Alabama, 219, U.S. 219, 210 (1911) “The power to create presumptions is not a means to escape from constitutional provisions.” In Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943) [I]t is not permissible [] to shift the burden by arbitrarily making one fact, which has no relevance to guilt of the offense, the occasion of casting on the defendant the obligation of exculpation.” The AGs Pleading continually require the “obligation of exculpation” by their off point facts and allegations. The Supreme Court has repeatedly told the federal judiciary it may not rely on a conclusive presumption to find against a defendant on an essential element of a cause of action. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521-523, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2458-2459 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654-657, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1214-1216 (1972)

IV. Tax Court Adjudicates using the “public rights” Doctrine and the Public Rights Doctrine is ONLY in the District of Columbia and Territories under the Plenary Power of Congress.

A. Chief Counsel Wilkins in This Instant Case 4-12-cv-441.


As the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service (“Chief Counsel Wilkins”) represents the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“CIR”) in Tax Court cases including the Defendants Tax Court Case XXXX-12 currently open that uses the venue (plenary power of Congress in the District of Columbia for “Taxation” and “Internal Revenue”13) and jurisdiction of the “public rights” doctrine that adjudicates a class of cases that are “conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative.14

With the Chief Counsel Wilkins jurisdiction conclusively established in the “public rights” doctrine jurisdiction and venue of cases being adjudicated; then we rely upon the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States to establish if the judicial Power of the United States is invoked with the answer being conclusively established––NO, there is no judicial Power of the United States and no appearance of anything resembling “judicial Power of the United States.”

The Supreme Court of the United States in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2510 (2011) “The plurality in Northern Pipeline recognized that there was a category of cases involving “public rights” that Congress could constitutionally assign to “legislative.” In the “public rights” doctrine matters could be “conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches” without judicial intervention as evidenced in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co, 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985).

Now in this instant Case we find in the Complaint in Docket 2 page 2 under parties and jurisdiction, the following:

1. Under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7401 and 7403, this action has been requested and authorized by the Chief Counsel of [for] the Internal Revenue Service and is brought at the direction of a delegate of the Attorney General of the United States.

The “client” is the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service (“Chief Counsel Wilkins”) where as the “Client” is the moving Party admitted in the Complaint in Docket 2 with the Attorney General of the United States representing the “client” flows a fortiori the “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” is the Chief Counsel Wilkins.

The “venue’ and the “jurisdiction” of the Tax Court is under the “public rights” doctrine and this is well-settled that the Tax Court adjudicates “public rights” as evidenced in Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. C.I.R., 930 F.2d 975, 992 (2nd Cir. 1991).

V. Jurisdictional Issues to Enter an Article III Court.


Does the “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,” whomever that entity may be, has it met the requirements of standing to sue the Defendants? The Answer is NO.

In the very recent case of American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 2015 WL 2097814 [Only the Westlaw citation is currently available], *8 (2nd Cir. 2015 [May 7th])

We recognize that “‘[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.’ “Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013), quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (alteration in original). In order to meet that requirement, plaintiffs must, among other things, establish that they have standing to sue. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). “Standing under Article III of the Constitution requires that an injury be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010); see also Amnesty Int’l, 133 S.Ct. at 1147 (collecting cases). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly reiterated that ‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.” Amnesty Int’l, 133 S.Ct. at 1147, quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (emphasis in original). We remain mindful that the “‘standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of [a] dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional’.”

Of Course if this Court is clothing itself with only the “characteristics” of an Article III Court as found in the District of Columbia adjudicating under the “public rights” doctrine using 28 U.S.C.§ 132; therein this USDC can proceed with administrative or legislative functions as found in Postum Cereal Co. Inc. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 700-701 (1926), to wit:

The distinction between the jurisdiction of this court which is confined to the hearing and decision of cases in the constitutional sense and that of administrative action and decision, power for which may be conferred upon courts of the District is shown in the case of Keller v. Potomac Electric Company, 261 U. S. 428, 440, 442, 443, (1923). There it is pointed out that, while Congress in its constitutional exercise of exclusive legislation over the District may clothe the courts of the District, not only with the jurisdiction and powers of the federal courts in the several states, but also with such authority as a state might confer on her courts (Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Company, 211 U. S. 210, 225, 226, (1908)), and so may vest courts of the District with administrative or legislative functions which are not properly judicial, it may not do so with this court, or any federal court established under article 3 of the Constitution. Of the jurisdiction of this court, we said, at page 444 of 261 U. S. (43 S. Ct. 449):

Such legislative or administrative jurisdiction, it is well settled, cannot be conferred on this court either directly or by appeal. The latest and fullest authority upon this point is to be found in the opinion of Mr. Justice Day, speaking for the court in Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1902). The principle there recognized and enforced on reason and authority is that the jurisdiction of this court and of the inferior courts of the United States ordained and established by Congress under and by virtue of the third article of the Constitution is limited to cases and controversies in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and does not extend to an issue of constitutional law framed by Congress for the purpose of invoking the advice of this court without real parties or a real case, or to administrative or legislative issues or controversies.


VI. Conclusion


The Defendants have provided extensive uncontroverted material facts and the Laws of the United States with Cases in support thereof arising under Article III of the Constitution of the United States exercising the judicial Power of the United States within the territorial boundaries precluding the District of Columbia and the Territories in this instant Case. And further, the AGs and IRS do not have Standing to Sue in bona fide Article III Court of the United States, are using the “public rights” doctrine against the defendants wherein the Defendants have no remedy, unalienable rights, no bona fide Article III Court remembering that the Defendants are not domiciled in the District of Columbia or one of the Territories, do have any obligation or duty to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. If such as known legal duty exists, that is an question of Law that this Court has not disclosed. “The existence of a known legal duty owed by a taxpayer is a question of law for the court”, and this was held in United States. v. Pirro, 96 F.Supp.2d 279, 283 (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1999). Affirmed in U.S. v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86 ( 2nd Cir. 2000).

See also United States. v. Ingredient Tech. Corp., 698 F.2d 88 (2nd Cir. 1983).

Therefore this instant Case’s Judgment should me vacated and then this instant Case dismissed.

Signature,


Signature,

VII. Certificate of Service


I certify that the Katniss Everdeen and Peeta Mellark has mailed via USPS first class prepaid this Reply to the following parties, to wit;

Sean M. Green

Trial Attorney, Tax Division

U.S. department of Justice

P.O. Box 7238, Ben franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

202-307-2554

Sean.M.Green@usdoj.gov


XXX

[Wells Fargo Home Mortgage & Wells Fargo Home]


XXXX
XXXXX

[Bank of America]

Date: XXXXX, 2015

Signature




1 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 508, 519 (1858) “This judicial power was justly regarded as indispensable”


2 Public Lands are under the plenary Power of Congress.

3 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.C. 3020, 3062 (2010).

4 Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260 (1935) “The assessment is given the force of a judgment, and if the amount assessed is not paid when due, administrative officials may seize the debtor's property to satisfy the debt. * * * The assessment supersedes the pleading, proof, and judgment necessary in an action at law, and has the force of such a judgment.”

5 Appeal of Terminal Wine Co, 1 B.T.A. 697, 701 (U.S.Bd.ofTaxAppeals 1925) “By its very definition and etymology the world ‘determination’ irresistibly connotes consideration, resolution, conclusion, and judgment * * * The determination from which a taxpayer may appeal is one which fixes the amount of deficiency in tax. It is the final decision by which the controversy as to the deficiency is settled and terminated, and by which a final conclusion is reached relative thereto and the extent and measure of the deficiency defined. An assessment made without compliance with the statutory remedy of appeal contained in section 250(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921, and against which a claim for abatement is received for consideration by the Commissioner, does not meet the definition of a determination above given.

6 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563, 564 (2004) “If the law was clearly established . . . a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” Citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-819 (1982); State of Ohio v. Davis, 584 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Sup.Ct. Ohio 1992) “Judges, unlike juries, are presumed to know the law.”; Leary v. Gledhill, 84 A.2d 725, 728 (Sup.Ct. NJ 1951) “A court will in general take judicial notice of and apply the law of its own jurisdiction without pleading or proof thereof, the judges being deemed to know the law or at least where it is to be found.”

7 Production Tool Corp. v. Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 688 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1982) citing the holdings in Chrysler v. Brown, “Legislative rules are said to have the “force and effect of law”-i.e., they are as binding on the courts as any statute enacted by Congress. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 295, 99 S.Ct. at 1714.”

8 Production Tool Corp. v. Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 688 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1982) citing the holdings in Chrysler v. Brown, “Legislative rules are said to have the “force and effect of law”-i.e., they are as binding on the courts as any statute enacted by Congress. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 295, 99 S.Ct. at 1714.”

9 Morton v. Rutz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974) “The Administrative Procedure Act was adopted to provide, inter alia, that administrative policies affecting individual rights and obligations be promulgated pursuant to certain stated procedures so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations.

10 Authority: 44 U.S.C 1506; sec. 6 E.O. 10530, 19 FR 2709; 3 CFR 1954-1958 Comp., p. 189; SOURCE: 37 FR 23603, Nov. 4, 1972 unless otherwise noted. 50 FR 12468, Mar. 28, 1985.

11 Authority: 44 U.S.C 1506; sec. 6 E.O. 10530, 19 FR 2709; 3 CFR 1954-1958 Comp., p. 189; SOURCE: 37 FR 23603, Nov. 4, 1972 unless otherwise noted.

12 Authority: 44 U.S.C 1506; sec. 6 E.O. 10530, 19 FR 2709; 3 CFR 1954-1958 Comp., p. 189; SOURCE: 37 FR 23603, Nov. 4, 1972 unless otherwise noted. 50 FR 12468, Mar. 28, 1985.

13 Kuretski v. C.I.R., 755 F.3d 929, 939-941 (D.C.Cir. 2014).

14 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co, 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985).

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