Burde, D. (2004). International NGOs and best practices: The art of educational lending. In G. Steiner-Khamsi (Ed.), The global politics of educational borrowing and lending. New York: Teachers College Press.
International NGOs and Best Practices: The Art of Educational Lending
Workers in international aid and development organizations often feel they are “damned if they do, and damned if they don’t” in choosing education program approaches to alleviate poverty, to create positive social change, or to further a variety of other development missions. In the world of education development, the international worker must navigate among the multiple, overlapping, but often conflicting goals of organizations, financiers, and program “beneficiaries,” as aid recipients or development participants are often called. On the one hand, international workers must adhere to “best practices” that are established based on the previous experiences of international agencies and generally accepted by program funders. Relying on these best practices can be a way to justify, or legitimize, transferring an educational model from one region to another (Halpin & Troyna, 1995; Luhmann, 1990; Schriewer, 2000; Steiner-Khamsi, 2000, 2002). On the other hand, according to the organizations’ own internal mandates, international workers must include local representatives in critical decisions about program design and implementation in order to encourage genuine local “ownership” of externally supported projects. Professional aid and development workers try to combat this difficulty by “animating” a community--sending locally hired representative to communities to help them identify their needs and take steps accordingly to address these needs. The tension between the emphasis placed on local versus international decision making remains, however, and it is not clear whether or how the process of promoting best practices is compatible with promoting local actors in the global polity.
These unresolved, practical dilemmas reemerge in the theoretical debate among comparative social scientists regarding the role of international development nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in the process of transferring education reforms and civil society institutions. World polity institutionalists identify INGOs as transnational bodies that “enact cultural models,” setting in motion specific processes that link the global with the local and increasingly penetrate “even the most peripheral social spaces” (Boli & Thomas, 1999, p. 5). These INGOs act as a “global civil society,” perpetuating educational reform models around the globe (Mundy & Murphy, 2001). Other scholars warn, however, of the need to question the empirical reality beneath globalizing discursive tactics and program models. They claim that INGOs’ discourse leaves a significant portion of potential participants out of the global dialogue, or conversely, may activate some to participate in ways that challenge notions of convergence (Jones, 1998; Popkewitz, 2000; Schriewer, 2000; Steiner-Khamsi, 2002). These scholars argue that it is essential to distinguish between language and practice in studying the convergence of educational reform in order to determine what is actually converging--action or discourse (Schriewer, 2000; Steiner-Khamsi, 2002).
In brief, with respect to the political space that international institutions occupy, I concur with the world polity institutionalists: in so far as INGOs’ burgeoning presence in the world and increased influence on civil society have allowed, they have been able to promote world-cultural principles that have “shaped the frames that orient other actors, including states” (Boli & Thomas, 1999, p. 15). At the local, community level in non-western countries, however, these frames break down. In other words, after INGOs complete their missions and move on, local actors may recycle this discourse, using the same old labels for new purposes, or new labels for old purposes, depending on the context and perspective. Or they may abandon the reform altogether, or feel that the reform has abandoned them. At the same time, international actors (INGOs and bilateral organizations) continue to use discursive tactics to satisfy the multiple agendas of conflicting political interests, giving the appearance of convergence.
In light of these theoretical positions, this chapter explores the role of international development nongovernmental organizations in the process of transferring, or “lending,” educational models internationally. INGOs often implement education reform models that are composed of a collage of best practices, frequently underwritten by US-based theories. Using data collected from an INGO-managed education program in Bosnia-Herzegovina,1 I argue that, at a local level, rhetoric converges more than action, and the way that INGOs implement education reform models often de-fangs conflicting political impulses, failing ultimately to link local actors to global processes. In addition, this chapter argues that, with a policy of educational lending, INGOs may be successful at satisfying the short-term emergency needs of their program beneficiaries, but the long-term goals of social mobilization and transformation will continue to elude them. There are a variety of explanations for these outcomes, including the contradictions that face non-democratic, nonprofit, service-delivery organizations in trying to achieve empowerment goals; the complexity of the discourse regarding parent-teacher associations (PTAs) and their international transfer; and the global “aid superstructure” (Smillie, 1998) within which INGOs operate.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section addresses particular aspects of the aid superstructure: why the role that INGOs play in transferring educational reforms is important, why parent-teacher associations--such seemingly insignificant organizations--are also important in the context of international development and civil society building, and what constitutes an “educational lender.” The second section analyzes the data from the education program in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), describing the program model, the contradictions in its implementation, and its ultimate failure to engage local actors on a global or long-term basis. The conclusions highlight the complex factors that contribute to the weak or nonexistent social mobilization of local actors.
The Aid Superstructure: Civil Society Building, PTAs, and Educational Lenders
Both the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in international development and the importance placed on civil society have expanded dramatically in the past decade (Boli & Thomas, 1999; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Vakil, 1997). The effect of these changes on humanitarian aid and development work with respect to education is apparent in the reliance on local “partner organizations” to implement reforms that have their roots elsewhere. When suitable local partners cannot be identified, INGOs promote new types of civic associations to implement projects.
In the spirit of civil society building, the act of fostering local civic associations itself has, in some cases, become a major reform goal among INGOs. In this context, PTAs, parent-school partnerships and other types of parental involvement in education have moved into the spotlight because they are considered excellent examples of local civic organizations (Putnam, 1993, 2000). Because an interest in education is believed to motivate civic engagement among parents, particularly women, committed to improving their children’s welfare, it is seen as a focal point for building civil society. Indeed, social scientists and humanitarian aid practitioners alike consider small civic associations such as PTAs to be ideal building blocks of civil society and to hold particular promise for repairing the social fabric that has been damaged by conflict. As a result, many international organizations administering aid in foreign countries promote PTAs or similar organizations as providers of multiple benefits for school and society.
These are high praises for small organizations. Although few studies have examined whether PTAs provide the benefits to civil society abroad in the ways that prominent theorists claim that they should, they remain a popular educational reform to lend to countries emerging from conflict. Whether or not they work, PTAs provide a vehicle for INGOs to claim increased local participation in poverty alleviation and social mobilization programs. Both the content (benefits to students) and process (community participation) of this reform model (PTAs) satisfy requirements of best practices, and, as a result, the policy of lending them may legitimize INGO work.
In order to better understand the argument outlined in this chapter, it is important to discuss the structure of international educational development. In the literature describing nongovernmental organizations, civil society scholars have written numerous essays regarding the definitional problems of NGOs and the categories among them (Chabbott, 1999; Esman & Uphoff, 1984; Korten, 1986; Lewis & Wallace, 2000; Salamon & Anheier, 1992; Vakil, 1997). The type of NGO that I focus on in this chapter is an international development nongovernmental organization that is primarily a service delivery organization, as opposed to a membership or advocacy agency. Membership organizations generally recruit members across class and race lines; they hold regular local meetings and convene assemblies of elected leaders at local, national, and international levels. Advocacy agencies usually rely on professionally led campaigns to shape public opinion, reform politics, and influence legislation via policy lobbying and public education (Skocpol, 1999). It is important to note that unlike membership or advocacy agencies, service delivery organizations are generally not equipped to address political claims of disenfranchised groups; instead they provide services that respond to the social or physical needs of these groups.
In the case presented below, the INGO² that designed and managed this emergency education program in the Balkans falls into the category of large, multinational, aid or development, service delivery organizations that operate internationally via satellite offices but are based in the United States. In general, their annual budgets are over $100 million, and their work focuses on humanitarian relief (food distribution, medical supplies, shelter, emergency education) and development (health care, education, micro finance, general community development projects).3 The particular INGO in this study works in over 40 countries with satellite offices, called field or country offices, directed by an expatriate. The expatriate usually works with a handful of foreign (international) staff in management or technical positions, and with 20 to 200--or more depending on the size and funding of its operations--local (national) staff working in management, technical, and operations positions.
For the purposes of this chapter, two categories of educational lenders are defined here: financing organizations (e.g., bilateral aid agencies) and implementing organizations (e.g., international development nongovernmental organizations). On the one hand, although bilateral aid agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) often carry out their work indirectly, they remain a powerful force among lenders since their requests for proposals frequently set agendas for reforms. On the other hand, international development nongovernmental organizations (e.g., Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, Save the Children Federation, World Learning and World Vision, to name a few) that apply for and win these grants have a more direct impact on educational lending and program results than the funding organization since they implement the education reforms that are designated by the requests for proposals. In applying for these grants, the INGOs usually use the same discourse designated by the funder to signal that they understand the parameters of the work involved. During implementation, the lending process enters another stage as INGOs add their own perspectives to the reform once the grant is won from USAID.
In order to understand the characteristics that made the PTA a best practice with the INGO, and to examine the convergence of discourse, we should note the theories and popular notions associated with parental involvement in educational management.
Parent-teacher associations are unusual and interesting because they are expected to “double-task”: they are expected to fulfill the purpose they were created to serve (improve local schools) and provide simultaneously a vehicle to produce add-on benefits that may relate to larger issues affecting education. As the association functions, it creates two by-products. One is the organization itself that can serve as a vehicle for other purposes in addition to what it was originally intended to do, and the other is the benefit of enjoying the public good that the PTA creates (i.e., improvements in school working hours, or in the curriculum) that is available to all parents whether or not they participate in the association (Coleman, 1990).
The goals of the INGO programs that lend and promote parental involvement in education abroad, in the case study described in this chapter, state that, the broad principles of the education program are meant to provide community members with “a nation-wide network” and “significant nation-wide capacity building” ([INGO], 1996, p. 4). In describing the role of parent volunteers in preschools, the INGO says:
Parent volunteers in the classroom assist the teacher in supervising small groups and providing individual care and in the process acquire better parenting and communication skills. Parent/citizen involvement in and commitment to the operation of a local, non-governmental institution is a practical and necessary step in the development of civil society. This program provides a large number of citizens with the opportunity and experience. ([INGO], 1996, p. 22)
Thus, the INGO education program emphasizes parents’ education, decision-making skills, and participation in local organizations that will lead to a wider impact on national education policy, and, following Putnam, on civil society.
The Case: Lending PTAs to the Balkans
The data for this chapter is drawn from a study of a preschool program sponsored by an international NGO in Croatia and BiH from 1993 to 2000. The case study focuses on how an INGO used PTAs to increase parental involvement in education in BiH in order to reach multiple humanitarian and development goals, and how local actors reacted to the concept of parental involvement, including the goals meant to arise from it. I collected data and conducted interviews with parents, teachers, trainers, and representatives of the INGO in BiH beginning in 1999 and continuing until the end of 2000, for a total of 10 months. In the following pages, I trace the transfer of the best practice of encouraging parental involvement in education, embodied by parent-teacher associations, to countries emerging from conflicts, and examine whether and how local actors were linked to global processes.
The INGO staff promoted the preschool program described here in the midst of war-torn Yugoslavia because they believed it would provide multiple services to communities in crisis and critical protection to small children. Specifically, the aims of the designers were as follows:
to provide high-quality, inexpensive early childhood education via a new and innovative program for the former Yugoslavia
to offer a return to normalcy that provided increased stability in a war-torn society
to provide income generation for women
to increase civic participation resulting in increased civil society
to translate community initiatives into education policy reform ([INGO], 1996)
The INGO provided funds to support the first nine months of preschool operations that included, among other things, teachers’ salaries, food for the children, and small renovations for the space. After nine months of funding for each preschool, the INGO withdrew its financial support. According to the INGO, terminating the funding enabled the international organization to use its grant to continue to open new preschools in other areas. When preschools continued to function without these funds, they were considered “sustainable.” The INGO’s funding for its own management paid for staff salaries, operations, and overhead costs in the United States. Thus, in relation to the preschools, the INGO essentially functioned as a grant-disbursement agency, providing communities with start-up and operating costs, and training in order to establish preschools and the associated local organizations. According to the INGO, the program promoted over a hundred parent associations, begun in the early-mid 1990s that continued to operate without continued foreign funding, and it provided a goal during and post-conflict that united parents and promoted ethnic reconciliation ([INGO], 1996).4
This education reform sponsored by the INGO in BiH was based on a general understanding of best practices in education and community development, although the designer (the first field office director of the INGO in the former Yugoslavia) did not have a background in education reform or international education. Starting preschools with engaged parents simply seemed like a good idea (Interview, [INGO] First Field Office Director, 1999).
In line with many development INGOs, the INGO featured in this case study believed that community commitment was the cornerstone to its preschool program’s success. Community ownership and local participation were essential ingredients to any work that it conducted. Thus, although the education goals were important, the program was also a civil society-building project that hinged on the best practice of creating parent-teacher associations. To this end, the INGO designed an elaborate management and training system to establish three levels of associations (parent, municipal, cantonal) to support the preschools. The most basic level was called “parent-support groups” and had a similar functional and operational definition as a local chapter of the American PTA. These nascent groups were given training in organizing, fund-raising, and management, with the aim of increasing parents’ participation, helping them to advocate and fund-raise for themselves, and ultimately sustain the preschools independently of the INGO. The international organization reasoned that bringing concerned parents and teachers together to care for and educate children would create the proper conditions for community mobilization and for enduring social change.
Simultaneously, the community building efforts appealed to donors: more than half of the funds received during the life of the program were secured because of explicit references to community development as an add-on benefit gained from parent involvement in the preschool program. Thus, the program was flexible enough to accommodate both USAID’s and the INGO’s interests.
Creating National Networks
As noted above, creating national networks were meant to strengthen civil society. Starting in the Federation of BiH (Federation) in 1994 and relying on a structure similar to the U.S. National PTA, the INGO intended to encourage parent and teacher involvement in school management by organizing communities in several ways and at four distinct levels. This involved the following activities:
1. Training for individual parents in early childhood development
2. Organizing parents into Parent Support Groups (PTAs) and providing training for these associations
3. Organizing association members into Municipal Level Organizations (MLOs) and providing training to the MLOs
4. Bringing MLOs together to form a Cantonal Level Organization (CLO) and providing training to the CLO.5
The INGO employed local facilitators, mentors, and sustainability trainers to organize parents into Parent Support Groups, to provide support to teachers, and to help local associations access funds. Motivated parents from the Parent Support Groups were invited to attend a community organization training session run by INGO staff which was usually held at the end of the nine months of material support to the preschool, in preparation for forming MLOs. The MLOs were meant to pursue and supply funds to PTAs in order to maintain the preschools. Members received training in techniques such as conducting needs assessments and proposal writing. There were 16 INGO-sponsored MLOs in BiH at the height of the program. Nine continued to function in one canton in the Federation until 1999 with the help of the INGO team of three trainers who provided training, seminars, and networking support to these associations. Three other organizations existed in some capacity without the INGO support, and four were defunct as of summer 1999.
In practice, in pursuit of finances, some MLO leaders used innovative ideas to support the program. For example, one received a van donated from Italy to drive children to and from preschools. However, this was the exception to their activities rather than the rule. Although all established working connections with international agencies for material donations, and used personal connections for local institutional support, institutional funding was not forthcoming. One MLO leader, for example, showed me several proposals she had written in response to donors’ requests for applications. The objectives were in line with the donors’ request, budgets were reasonable, the organizational structure was sufficient, but each proposal had been declined. Without INGO representatives to facilitate the process, the nascent local associations could not bridge the divide between the local activities and global funding. These MLOs did not remain active for long after they had stopped receiving funds or training from the INGO.
Contradictions and Legitimacy
Attempting to animate communities with short-term commitments and inconsistent interventions produced the intended discourse but did not produce the intended results. Given that INGOs are accountable ultimately to their donors, it is difficult for a service delivery organization such as the INGO described here to operate between opposing political paradigms. Donor requirements can conflict with, and significantly hamper, an INGO’s mission to create “lasting, positive changes” ([INGO], 2002). Or, in other words, INGOs are not always in the best position to support the political interests of their program beneficiaries.
In BiH, conflicts emerged in the lending process between the INGO and USAID when the INGO was set to begin work in the Serb Republic (RS) and USAID tied conditions to its grant making there.6 If the INGO agreed to accept funds in this situation, it was meant to manage the expectations of the donor by actively enforcing the donor’s political conditions. The INGO accepted the funds although the decision subsequently created difficulties for the organization’s credibility with the new communities in which it was planning to work7 (Interview, Former Staff Member, 1999).
But the US government was not the only governing body that required conditions from the INGO. Local government officials also requested that the INGO compromise on its long-term goal of social mobilization. Although sustainability and community development were critical issues for the INGO in representing the program to donors funding the program as well as for its own internal standards that emphasized the importance of parental involvement, it was not critical or even important to local government officials. After the peace agreement was signed in 1995 and the government systems began to reassert themselves, the INGO revised its community approach to education in order to appeal to the local educators with whom it had to work, and to secure funding and government space for the preschools. Aspects of the education reform program that clashed with government education philosophy were modified or eliminated. For example, in the Federation, the INGO downplayed its use of paraprofessional teachers and reinforced the educational value of the program. In negotiating program administration in the RS, the program was inserted into government kindergartens, thereby generally eliminating problems with space, but also placing the program back into the hands of ex-socialist, government workers. Neither PTAs, nor parental involvement of any kind, were a priority for the local government, and the INGO did not advocate for supporting them.
As a result, after a short time of implementing the preschool model with its strong, original emphasis on parental involvement, almost all traces of the best practice promoted by the INGO vanished into the vortex of government bureaucracy. From the perspective of local actors--government officials, teachers, and parents--ultimately there was little convergence between the international model and the locally implemented program.
Long Term Goals and “Sustainability”
Conflicting demands placed on INGOs in implementing their programs affect their ability to promote model reforms, but, at the same time, the internal structure of the INGO itself may compound this dilemma in its attempts to create sustainability. There is confusion among donor and implementing agencies alike about the definition and importance of sustainability, particularly during or after an emergency. International donors use the word sustainability to describe the potential of their investment to be adopted by the local community, managed and for the most part funded by local nonprofit, for profit, or government groups. In the case presented here, sustainability was central to the program design from the outset, and it was the evidence used to back the INGO claims of success at civil society building. Instead of creating sustainability, however, the INGO seemed to create layers of professionals, isolating local actors from the global polity.
The INGO tracked and judged sustainability on several levels. First, numbers were critical in assessing a sustainable program. For example, the number of preschools that remained in existence after the foreign funding was withdrawn, the number of parent support groups established, and the number of teachers trained were important indicators. Second, recording community action that asserted rights to services was considered an important representation of systemic change. In addition, cost was linked directly to sustainability. The program was meant to be inexpensive without sacrificing quality so that “community members will both want it and can afford to own and operate it” ([INGO], 1996). Included in the support were the teachers’ manual, classroom consumable kits, hygienic kits, teacher remuneration, mentoring, and seminar costs. According to the first field office director, “if a preschool is able to operate one month after [foreign] funding has ended then [the INGO] considers it sustainable.” The international organization limited the definition because “we didn’t want the responsibility of continuing to monitor something that we didn’t have the time or resources to track” (Interview, 1999).
These criteria only satisfied the short-term education goals of the program; they did not promote social mobilization, nor provide parents with direct access to shaping “the frames that orient actors, including states” (Boli & Thomas, 1999, p. 15). If the INGO preschool program aimed only to provide a service, it did so. If, on the other hand, the INGO aimed to reach its long-term mission of creating lasting change, the program did not. It did not leave behind an extensive network of community associations that supported and advocated for innovative preschools, and that introduced child-centered learning, shorter education programs, and learning through play into the nationwide preschool system. Instead, it trained and funded a layer of local professionals who worked between local communities and international institutions until the funds ended, and they sought jobs elsewhere. Thus, after the funding for the program ceased, the link between parent members of associations and broader structures was severed.
In the world of international development, INGO model education reforms do seem to be converging on an international level--most INGOs and bilateral development organizations share model program interventions and best practices. According to this case study, even among the local staff of INGOs, there is a convergence of professionals, their training, and certainly their rhetoric. Program beneficiaries, however, seem to either participate in old ways that are familiar to them, eschewing the new models, or seem to be left out of the process altogether. Thus, the global polity does not appear to be stretching to isolated communities, including the inhabitants of the outer most limits of marginal spaces, as some scholars believe.
It is not surprising that committed and altruistic development workers feel “damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.” Although their good intentions may be genuine, INGOs, like the one described above, must cater to donors and other interested parties in order to realize their programs. The resulting mixture of inconsistent activities and priorities and short-term projects prevents INGOs from engaging their local counterparts in lasting community mobilization. Making deals with donors and restricting themselves to prescribed timeframes decrease the INGOs’ legitimacy in the eyes of the program participants. In the case of education reform models that focus on community participation, if decentralization occurs without empowerment, without links to the global polity, it poses a real danger for local communities. When INGOs move on to the next project, an entire layer of local field staff facilitators (animators, sustainability trainers, fundraisers) may disappear along with them, leaving isolated, autonomous community members, without lasting links to functioning networks, frustrated and often devoid of resources.
The aid superstructure is difficult to change and educational lending on the part of INGOs plays a powerful role in perpetuating it. INGOs justify their educational lending primarily through rhetoric and slogans (Joshi & Moore, 2000; Lewis & Wallace, 2000; Lynch, 1998). In the case discussed here, justification occurred by proclaiming program principles of “parent involvement,” “community participation,” “community-ownership,” and “nation-wide networks.” The PTAs in Bosnia-Herzegovina provided a vehicle for INGOs to claim that they were adhering to these principles, but the structure of service delivery organizations is ill-suited to establish networked, membership-based associations. Best practices continue to be transferred for what they represent, or for their potential achievements, but INGOs are hemmed in by their own constraints and cannot provide an effective and stable strategy to simultaneously critique the problems with these reforms and then address them. Since accountability lags significantly behind programming, there are few incentives to change the system.
The Putnam assumptions about the importance of the type of civic association that parent-teacher associations represent underpin their design in most humanitarian and development programs. This case study in BiH shows, however, that emphasizing parental participation without including locally rooted advocates in the networking process, does not link the local to the global. The process is as critical as the content. Fostering an organization from outside that is focused on providing a service is not sufficient to produce the multiple benefits described above because links to political power must also be maintained. In the case study example discussed here, when the layer of professional INGO staff was removed, the remaining PTAs were not nationally linked. Thus, parents lack a mechanism through which they may advocate for the education of their children.
These points are critical in analyzing the lending of PTAs to countries emerging from conflict. An effective PTA advocates for community interests and mobilizes members, thereby shaping local, state, and national legislation (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). However, parental involvement that is transferred piecemeal, without taking into consideration the importance of broad national or international participation, will not increase civic engagement. Nonetheless, civil society theories such as Putnam’s continue to provide persuasive arguments for supporting the loan of this best practice, while sidestepping larger questions of resource distribution and the kinds of participation that define civic engagement in particular local contexts.
Finally, long-term social change and local participation that is linked beyond the confines of a single village are not accomplished by outsiders organizing brief training sessions to train poor, disenfranchised people to create civic associations. Some INGOs are beginning to change their work style. Instead of building field offices abroad and promoting educational lending and best practices, they form lasting, rooted partnerships with local citizens and organizations. These local educators may request innovative approaches to education from their foreign counterparts. Linking local educators and organizations to international actors can be a powerful advocacy tool for local groups to use to promote their own vision of their education systems. Networks among international and national NGOs can provide local educators with essential information to form future education policy. It is not beyond the scope of possibility to foster the equivalent of highly functioning PTAs and increase social mobilization as a result, but it requires conditions different from the ones illustrated by this case. Until structural conditions change, INGOs’ practice of lending and their dependence on funding agencies will continue to leave local actors isolated and will continue to shift INGOs’ priorities away from their long-term goals.
The Dayton Agreement preserved Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) as one country but divided it into two entities with largely distinct administrative processes: 1) the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Federation), and 2) the Serb Republic (RS). The Federation is divided into 10 cantons (three Croat, five Muslim, and two mixed) that are subdivided into municipalities. The RS is divided into municipalities, but has retained a highly centralized administrative structure similar to that of the former Yugoslavia.
2 The international development organization featured in this case study is referred to as the “INGO” throughout this chapter (e.g., [INGO], 1996, 2002), not only to keep it anonymous, but also to highlight the similar structural characteristics, mission statements, and types of programs among the group of large, multinational aid and development organizations that it symbolizes.
3 The agencies launching these initiatives define education in humanitarian relief programs as “emergency education” with programs normally being short-term, rapid intervention consisting of educational materials such as “educational toolkits” adapted to populations living in, or affected by conflict. This is in contrast to longer term “development education” programs that rely on established materials and try to address systemic changes at an education policy level. The former focus on particular themes, such as landmine awareness or recovery from trauma. Other substantive differences between emergency and development education programs are debated among critics and proponents.
4 Although this information is summarized from the INGO annual report from 1996, the INGO reiterated these points in 1999 at a conference on emergency education hosted by the World Bank.
5 This structure was for the Federation preschools; the organizations were formed in a different way in the RS because of the timing and structure of the program.
6 According to USAID representatives, conditions were also applied to the Muslim-Croat Federation; however, in the case of the INGO program, these conditions were not implemented in either entity until after the USAID grant was already terminated in the Federation.
7 One INGO staff member eventually resigned as a result of this decision.
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